Aging and the Welfare State: The Role of Young and Old Voting Pivots by Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
AGING AND THE WELFARE STATE:









A first version of this paper was written while the authors were visiting CES, Munich. We wish to thank Ken
Judd for some useful discussion on the nature of the equilibrium dynamics. We thank also Edith Sand far a
competent research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 © 2004 by Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.  Aging and the Welfare State: The Role of Young and Old Voting Pivots
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka
NBER Working Paper No. 10967
December 2004
JEL No. E6, H2
ABSTRACT
An income tax is generally levied on both capital and labor income. The working young bears mostly
the burden of the tax on labor income, whereas the retired old, who already acummulated her
savings, bears the brunt of the capital income tax. Therefore, there arise two types of conflict in the
determination of the income tax: the standard intragenerational conflict between the poor and the
rich, and an ntergenerational conflict between the young and the old. The paper studies how aging
affects the resolution of these conflicts, and the politico-economic forces that are at play: the changes
in the voting pivots and the fiscal leakage from tax payers to transfer recipients.
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In a nutshell, a welfare state levies taxes on income and redistributes the revenues among
its members. As such, it generates a multitude of political forces which interact with each
other in forming a politico-economic equilibrium. The main components of the income
tax base are labor income and capital income. The incidence of the labor income tax
is relatively strongest on the young working individuals. By contrast, these individuals
have typically little capital income. It is the (retired) old who have the lion￿ s share of
capital income. Furthermore, this type of income is typically the main, if not the sole,
source of income of the old. At any point in time, the attitude of a forward looking young
towards an income tax is a⁄ected not only by how much tax she will pay on her labor
income. She is obviously concerned also by the tax on her capital income which, though
typically small at present, will increase gradually to become a major source of her income,
as she grows older. The retiree is nevertheless concerned only about the capital income
tax (save for any altruism towards her o⁄spring). At the same time, as the redistribution
done by the welfare state is typically biased in favor of the old (old-age social security,
medicare, etc.), she expects her cohort to receive the lion￿ s share of the transfers that the
income tax revenues can ￿nance. Thus, the political economics of how the income tax
is determined is very subtle. There is a variety of factors at play, some reinforcing each
other and some con￿ icting with one another. In particular, aging of the population has
important implications for the transformation of the income tax in the welfare state.1 In
this paper we develop a simple politico-economic model of the welfare state in order to
study the implications of aging for the transformation of the political forces at play and
their e⁄ects on the ￿nal design of the income tax.
1Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) forecast a continuing strong trend of increasing life expectancy among the
best performing economies. Numerous studies investigate the implications of such trends on the welfare
state; see e.g. Borsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003), Tosun (2003) and Razin and Sadka (forthcoming).
They did not, however, focus on the intra and intergeneration con￿ icts around the design of the income tax
which is at the center of this paper.
2In this paper we consider a representative welfare state which levies taxes on income,
and grants a ￿ at bene￿t (demogrant) to all its members. We employ an overlapping-
generations framework in which each generation lives for two periods: in the ￿rst period
of her life, an individual invests in human capital and work; in the second period she
retires. Thus, in each period there is one generation (the young) who has labor income
only and another generation (the old) who has capital income only. Assume further that
the welfare state has a pay-as-you-go type of ￿nancing. That is: the government￿ s budget
is balanced every period. This setup yields itself to a two-type political con￿ ict. First,
there is an intergenerational aspect of the con￿ ict: In each period the old would like to
tax labor, whereas the young would prefer to tax capital. Second, there is the standard
intra-generational con￿ ict between the poor (young and old) and the rich (young and old).
The income tax is determined as an equilibrium outcome of all these forces2 3. We then
study how aging alters the equilibrium outcome4.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section develops a politico-
economic model of income taxation in the welfare state. Section 3 studies the equilibrium
in this model. The e⁄ects of aging on the politico-economic equilibrium in the welfare state
are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Politico-Economic Model of Income Taxation
At the heart of any politico-economic equilibrium there must be some underlying distrib-
ution of income. For concreteness, our model generates an income distribution based on
2Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981) pioneered the literature on the determination of economic policy in
a general politico-economic equilibrium framework.
3Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Alesina and Perroti (1996) address the issue of the political con￿ ict
around redistributive policies in the context of economic growth. For some more recent surveys of the
politico-economic con￿ ict in other contexts see Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Drazen (1998).
4In Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) we studied theoretically and empirically the implications of aging
for a welfare state which employs a tax on labor income only. In such a framework the role of the old in
the political game is reduced to a straightforward pro-tax stand, because they have no labor income to be
taxed.
3human-capital formation framework, with an exogenously given heterogeneity in innate
ability. We assume an overlapping-generations model in which each generation lives for
two periods: A working period and a retirement period.
Evidently, an income tax creates two distortions. As a tax on capital income, it distorts
saving-consumption decisions. As a tax on labor income, it distorts human capital invest-
ment decisions. In each period only the old have capital income, whereas only the young
have labor income. There is therefore an intergenerational con￿ ict (between the young and
the old) in the determination of the taxes in each period. In each period the young would
prefer to tax only capital income in that period. (The capital income of the young would
be taxes only in the next period in another round of voting.) On the other hand, the old
would like to tax only labor income (save for altruism for the young o⁄spring).
We assume some kind of an implicit intergenerational contract by which labor and
capital are taxed at a uniform rate (￿). The revenues are used to provide a ￿ at bene￿t (b):
The tax rate and the generosity of the bene￿t are linked through the government￿ s budget
constraint. In a multi-period setting such as ours, this simple speci￿cation captures the
spirit of a pay-as-you-go tax-transfer system. The features of the transfer can include a
uniform per capita grant (either in cash or in-kind, such as national health care), as well as
age-related bene￿ts such as old-age social security and medicare, or free public education.5
In addition to the intergenerational con￿ ict, there is also the standard con￿ ict between the
rich and the poor of both generations.
2.1 Skill-Acquisition Decisions
We assume a stylized economy in which there are two types of workers: Skilled workers
who have high productivity and provide qH e¢ ciency units of labor per each unit of labor
5Strictly speaking, the transfer is de￿ned per family so that the number of children in the family does
not a⁄ect the attitude of the family toward the transfer. Therefore, the number of children does not a⁄ect
the voting decision of the family. Also, each family (whether young or old and irrespective of the number
of children) consists of the same number of eligible voters.
4time, and unskilled workers who have low productivity and provide only qL e¢ ciency units
of labor per each unit of labor time, where qL < qH: Workers have one unit of labor time
during their ￿rst period of life, but are born without skills and thus with low productivity.
Each worker chooses whether to acquire an education and become a skilled worker or remain
unskilled. After the working period, individuals retire, with their consumption funded by
savings.
There is a continuum of individuals, characterized by an innate ability parameter, e;
which is the time needed to acquire an education. By investing e units of labor time in
education, a worker becomes skilled after which the remaining 1￿ e units of labor time
provide an amount of (1 ￿ e)qH units of e⁄ective labor. Less capable individuals require
more time to become skilled and thus ￿nd education more costly in terms of lost income
(education is a full-time activity). We assume that there is also a positive pecuniary cost
of acquiring skills, ￿; which is not tax deductible.6 The cumulative distribution function
of innate ability is denoted by G(e); with the support being the interval [0;1]: The density
function is denoted by g = G0:
If an e￿ individual (namely, an individual with an education-cost parameter e) decides
to become skilled, then her after-tax income is (1 ￿ ￿)wqH(1 ￿ e) + b ￿ ￿; where w is the
wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor, ￿ is the ￿ at tax on labor income, and b is a uniform
bene￿t (demogrant). If she remains unskilled, her after-tax income is (1￿￿)qLw+b: Note
that, naturally, acquiring a skill is more attractive for individuals with low cost of education
than for individuals with higher costs.
Thus, there exists a cuto⁄ level, e￿; such that those with education-cost parameter
below e￿ invest in education and become skilled, whereas everyone else remains unskilled.
This cuto⁄ level is the cost-of-education parameter of an individual who is just indi⁄erent
6This is typically the case in practice where the out-of-pocket cost of investment in human capital is
not tax-deductible. In contrast, investment in physical capital is tax-deductible, albeit imperfectly, through
annual depreciation allowances (rather than full dispensing).
5between becoming skilled or not:
(1 ￿ ￿)wqH(1 ￿ e￿) + b ￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)qLw + b:
Rearranging terms gives the cuto⁄ level for the education decision:







Note that the higher is the tax rate the lower is e￿: That is, the fraction of skilled in the
labor force falls with the tax rate.
In order to simplify the dynamics of the model we assume that factor prices are not
variable. We specify a production function which is e⁄ectively linear in labor, L; and
capital, K :
Y = wL + (1 + r)K; (2)
where Y is gross output. The wage rate, w; and the gross rental price of capital, 1 + r;
are determined by the marginal productivity conditions for factor prices (w = @Y=@L and
1+r = @Y=@K) and are already substituted into the production function. The linearity of
the production function can arise as an equilibrium outcome through either international
capital mobility or factor price equalization arising from goods￿trade. For simplicity, the
two types of labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production in terms of e¢ ciency
units of labor input, and capital is assumed to fully depreciate at the end of the production
process.
We assume that the population grows at a rate of n: Because individuals work only in
the ￿rst period, the ratio of retirees to workers is 1=(1 + n); and the dependency ratio -
retired as a share of the total population - equals 1=(2 + n):
Each individual￿ s labor supply is assumed to be ￿xed, so that the income tax does not
distort individual labor supply decisions at the margin. The total labor supply does, how-
6ever, depend on the income tax rate, as this a⁄ects the cuto⁄ cost-of-education parameter
e￿ and thus the mix of high and low skill workers in the economy. This can be seen from
equation (1) which implies that e￿ is declining in ￿; so that the tax system is distortive.7
An increase in ￿ reduces the share of the skilled individuals in the labor force. This, in
turn, reduces the e⁄ective labor supply and output. We denote by ￿t and bt the tax rate





(1 ￿ e)qHdG + qLf1 ￿ G[e￿(￿t)]g
!
N0(1 + n)t = ‘(￿t)N0(1 + n)t; (3)
where N0(1+n)t is the size of the working age population in period t (with N0 the number
of young individuals in period 0), and ‘(￿t) =
R e￿(￿t)
0 (1￿ e)qHdG + qLf1 ￿ G[e￿(￿t)]g is
the average (per worker) labor supply in period t: This speci￿cation implies that for each e
and t; the number of individuals in period t; with a cost-of-education parameter less than
or equal to e; is (1 + n)t times the number of such individuals in period 0.
2.2 Saving Decisions
An individual consumes one consumption good in each period of her life: First-period con-
sumption of an individual born at t is denoted by c1t and second-period consumption of this
individual is denoted by c2t: Individuals have identical preferences which are represented
by u(c1t; c2t): The life-time budget constraint of an e￿ individual is:
c1t +
c2t
1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)r
= W(e;￿1t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1); (4)
where W(￿) is her life-time income or wealth:
7A further distortion is caused in practice by the progression of the income tax, as the opportunity cost
of investment in human capital (in the form of foregone income) is typically taxed at a lower rate than the





(1 ￿ ￿t)qHw(1 ￿ e) + bt +
bt+1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)r
if e 5 e￿(￿t)
(1 ￿ ￿t)qLw + bt +
bt+1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)r
if e = e￿(￿t)
(5)
Maximization of u; subject to the budget constraint yield the consumption demand
functions, Ci(e;￿t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1)); i = 1;2 , and the indirect utility function, v(e;￿t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1):
The saving of an e￿ young individual is:
s(e;￿t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1) = W(e;￿t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1) ￿ C1(e;￿t;￿t+1;bt;bt+1): (6)





2.3 The Government Budget Constraint
The government balances its budgets period-by-period. Its outlays in period t are bt[N0(1+
n)t￿1 + N0(1 + n)t]; as there are N0(1 + n)t￿1 old people and N0(1 + n)t young people
living in period t: Its revenues come from the income tax on both labor and capital. Only
the old have savings and capital income. The saving of an e￿ (old) individual in period
t; which is exogenously given, is denoted by st￿1(e): Average (per old) saving in period t;





Only the young have labor income. Thus, the government￿ s budget constraint in period




[rSt￿1 + (1 + n)w‘(￿t)]: (9)
In period t; St￿1 is given, so that the government￿ s budget constraint determines bt as
a function of ￿t and St￿1 : bt = B(￿t;St￿1) :
3 A Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In period t; the tax rate ￿t is determined by the majority of the people (old and young)
alive in this period. (Recall that this choice of ￿t determines also bt:) The old naturally
care only about ￿t (and bt); because period t is their last period of life. However, the young
who will grow to be old in period t + 1 are aware that their welfare depends also on the
tax rate, ￿t+1; and the bene￿t, bt+1; that will be determined in period t + 1:
We now turn to the description of a politico-economic equilibrium. We look ￿rst at
the voting decision of an old individual with an education-cost parameter e: Her saving,
denoted by s￿1(e); has already been predermined. Her net gain from the tax-transfer
system, denoted by V O
t (e); is given by:
V O
t (e) ￿ V O(e;￿t;st
t￿1) = B(￿t;st￿1) ￿ ￿trst￿1(e): (10)
She will vote for raising (lowering) the tax rate ￿t; if @V O=@￿t > (<)0: Note that
st￿1(e) is strictly declining in e for all e < e￿ (assuming normality), and then becomes ￿ at
for e = e￿: Thus, if a certain tax hike bene￿ts an old person with ability parameter e0;
it must also bene￿t all old people with ability parameter above e0 (that is, all less able
individuals). Conversely, if an (old) e0￿ individual favors a certain tax cut, then all persons
with a lower e (the more able) will also favor such a tax cut. To see this formally, note
from equation (10) that @(@V O=@￿t)=@e = @2V O=@￿t@e = ￿rdst￿1=de ￿ 0: This result
implies that the old population is always divided just by one cuto⁄ level of e in its attitude
toward a tax hike or a tax cut.
9Consider next a young individual of type e: Her indirect utility function is denoted by:
V Y
t (e) = v[e;￿t;B(￿t;st￿1);￿t+1;bt+1]: (11)
She will vote for raising (lowering) the tax if @v=@￿t > (<)0: We plausibly assume that
@2v=@￿t@e ￿ 0: That is, if a certain tax hike bene￿ts a young individual of type e1; it
must bene￿t all individuals with e > e1 (that is, who are poorer than her); conversely, if
a tax cut is bene￿cial for an e1￿ individual, it must also be bene￿cial for all individuals
with e < e1 (that is, who are richer than her). This assumption holds, for instance, with a
log-linear utility function. This result implies that the young population is also divided by
just one cuto⁄ level of e in its attitude toward a tax hike or a tax cut.
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This implies that in each period there is a pair of individuals, one old (with an ability
parameter eO
t ) and one young (with an ability parameter eY
t ); who each plays the role of a
￿pivot" for her respective generation. Note that in equilibrium these pivots￿preferred choice
must be the same tax rate ￿￿
t - see equations (12 ) and (13 ). Together, these pivots divide
the total population (of the old and the young) evenly, so that the preferred tax rate ￿￿
t is
consistent with the outcome of majority voting. All old individuals with ability parameters
above eO
t and all young individuals with ability parameters above eY
t would prefer a higher
tax rate than (or, at least, the same tax rate as) ￿￿
t: All old individuals with ability
parameters below eO
t and all young individuals with ability parameters below eY
t would
prefer a lower tax rate than (or the same tax rate as) ￿￿
t: To see that these pivots divide
the total population (of the old and the young) evenly, note that the number of old people
with ability parameters below eO
t is G(eO
t )N0(1 + n)t￿1: Similarly, the number of young
individuals with ability parameters below eY
t is G(eY
t )N0(1+n)t: The rest of the population




Equating the latter expression with G(eO
t )N0(1+n)t￿1 +G(eY
t )N0(1+n)t yields equation
(14).
In period t, the young individual￿ s choice of the tax rate and the bene￿t for this period
depends on her expectations about the tax rate, ￿￿
t+1; and the bene￿t, b￿
t+1; that will prevail
in period t + 1. We further assume that these expectations are self-ful￿lling. This is the
essence of equations (15)-(17). Note that voters internalize the "no-free-lunch" principle
of economics, in the sense that they realize that the bene￿t in each period depends on the
tax rate in the same period. (Thus, they do not trust candidates that over-promise to cut
taxes without a corresponding cut in bene￿ts). This is re￿ ected in having the argument
B(￿t;St￿1); rather than simply bt; in the function v(:) in equation (13): But we assume,
for the sake of tractability, that they do not internalize the e⁄ect of their voting outcome
11today on the voting outcome of tomorrow. This explains why we put ￿￿
t+1 and b￿
t+1, as
exogenously given arguments in the utility function v(:) in equation (13).
4 The E⁄ect of Aging
Recall that the dependcy ratio is equal to 1=(2+n): Thus, as the growth rate of the popula-
tion (n) declines, the population ages and the dependency ratio rises. We investigate in this
section how the aging process alters the size of the welfare state, namely the magnitudes
of the tax and bene￿t parameters. For tractability we resort to numerical simulations of
steady-state equilibria. In the simulations, the utility function is U(c1;c2) = logc1 +logc2
and e is uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1].
4.1 Labor Tax
In order to provide the intuition behind the results, we start with a benchmark special case
of our framework in which the income tax is levied only on labor income. In this case there
are two factors at play when the population ages (that is, n declines). First, note that the
old who have no labor income are all for raising the income tax. Therefore,there is only
one pivot, who is a young individual, and she is the median voter. Her cost-of-education
parameter is eY = (2+n)=2(1+n): As n decline, eY rises. That is, as the population ages,
a poorer individual becomes the median voter. Naturally, being poorer than the previous
median voter, the new median voter bene￿ts (weakly) more from the welfare state system
(she pays less taxes and gets the same transfer). This factor works in the direction of
hiking the tax rate when the population ages. [We refer to this factor as the shift of the
pivot (or the median voter).] But, there is a second factor which works in the opposite
direction when the population ages. The median voter realizes that tax revenues are spread
now more thinly across the population, including herself, as they must support more old
bene￿ciaries (who receives the transfer but pay no taxes). Therefore, her appetite for tax
12hikes is tanned. This factor works in the direction of trimming the size of the welfare state,
when the population ages. (We refer to this factor as the ￿scal leakage9.)
Note that all unskilled individuals have the same income regardless of their cost-of-
education parameter (because they do not engage in the education activity). Therefore
they have the same attitude towards ￿ and b. Thus, when the median voter is an unskilled
individual, the ￿rst factor is nill, and only the ￿scal leakage factor is at play. Hence, as the
population ages (that is, n declines), the tax rate falls. This is depicted in Figure 1.
Now we turn to the case when the median voter is a skilled individual. Now, the two
con￿ icting factors are at play. One cannot apriori determine which of these two factors
dominates. In Figure 1, the ￿rst factor (the shift in the median voter) dominates the
second factor (the ￿scal leakage): when the population ages (that is, n declines), the tax
rate rises.
4.2 Capital Tax
A second benchmark case is of capital taxation only. This is a very simple case. As
long as the population grows (that is, n > 0), then the young constitute the majority of
the population. The young have no capital income. Also, as the savings of the old are
predetermined, there is no distortion created by taxing capital, so that raising the tax will
always generates more tax revenues for the bene￿t of all (young and old). Therefore, the
majority will opt for a 100% tax on capital (as in the standard time-incosistency context).
4.3 Income Tax
We now return to study the object of interest in this paper, which is the e⁄ect of aging
on the income tax (on both labor and capital). Unlike the labor tax case where the old
were all for raising the tax, now, as the tax is levied on capital income too, the old are
no longer unanimous in their attitude towards the tax; the rich old may well be against
9See also Becker (1998).
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a. Unskilled Pivot: r=5, w=2,       =1,         =0.25,        =0.5, =0.5.
b. Skilled Pivot: r=2, w=5,       =1,        =0.001,       =0.0001, =0.5. H q L q γ β
H q L q γ β
Notes:
Parameter Values are:
a. Unskilled Pivot: r=5, w=2,       =1,         =0.25,        =0.5, =0.5.
b. Skilled Pivot: r=2, w=5,       =1,        =0.001,       =0.0001, =0.5. H q L q γ β
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Of the Skilled Young Pivot
τthe income tax. Therefore, the old pivot is also relevant for the determination of the tax
transfer system. Thus, each one of the two cases studied under the labor tax (the pivot
young being either skilled or unskilled) must be separated into two cases according as to
whether the old pivot is skilled or unskilled. Therefore, there are altogether four cases that
we will investigate below.
Note in general that the ￿scal leakage factor is no longer clear-cut. As the income tax
base includes both labor and capital income, then the labor tax component of the income
tax is levied on the young only, but the revenues from it "leak" to the old as well. Similarly,
the capital tax component is levied on the old only, but the revenues from it "leak" to the
young as well. Therefore, the ￿scal leakage factor becomes ambiguous.
(a) Young pivot - skilled; old - pivot skilled
Recall that with a tax on labor only, the ￿rst factor vanishes (because the young is
unskilled) and the second (the ￿scal leakage) factor decreased the tax rate as population
ages. But, with an income tax, the ￿rst factor (the change of the pivot) reemerges because
the old pivot is skilled. As can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 2, eO, the education-cost
parameter of the old pivot, declines as population ages. That is, the old pivot changes to
a richer (more skilled) individual whose anti-tax attitude is stronger and she would have
preferred to lower the tax. However, apparently the ￿scal leakage e⁄ect becomes strongly
in favor of raising the tax, as the young are now more motivated to raise the tax because
there are more old people to be taxed, so that more revenues from the capital tax can leak
to the young. The latter e⁄ect dominates and the politico-economic equilibrium tax rate
rises as the population ages.
(b) Young pivot - unskilled; old pivot - unskilled
This con￿guration cannot in general produce an equilibrium. When a pivot, whether
young or old, is unskilled, then a small change in the identity of the pivot does not change
her attitude towards the tax. When both pivots are unskilled, then small changes in the
14Figure 2: The Income Tax 
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r=4 , w=2 ,      =1 ,       =0.1 ,      =0.5 ,      =0.5. H q L q γ β
Notes:
Parameter Values are:
r=4 , w=2 ,      =1 ,       =0.1 ,      =0.5 ,      =0.5. H q L q γ βidentities of both pivots do not produce a change in the preferred tax rate. At the same
time, both pivots must prefer the same tax rate in a politico-economic equilibrium. Such
a single tax rate need not exist.
(c) Young pivot - skilled; old pivot - skilled
As can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 3, the young pivot changes to a poorer (less
skilled) individual who would also like to expand the size of the welfare state. Similarly,
the old pivot also changes in the same direction, and the new old pivot would like to hike
the tax. But apparently, the ￿scal leakage factor stemming from the tax revenues (and
especially those from the labor tax component) being spread over a larger population of
the old, dominates: as population ages, the income tax rate declines.
(d) Young pivot - skilled; old pivot - unskilled
This case is depicted in Figure 4. As the population ages, the identity of young pivot,
who is skilled, changes to a more able individual (with a lower cost-of-education parameter).
This new pivot would like to cut the tax rate. The identity of the old pivot changes too
to a more able individual; but this change does not have any e⁄ect on the preferred tax
rate of the old pivot, as she is unskilled. In case (c) above, the skilled young pivot became
less able and more pro-tax. Nevertheless, the ￿scal leakage e⁄ect dominated, and the tax
rate declined, as the population aged. In our case, the tax certainly has to decline as the
population ages, because the young skilled pivot becomes more able and more anti-tax.
The results of the above cases are summarized in Table 1.
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r=5 , w=2 ,       =1,        =0.6,      =0. 1,       =0.5. H q L q γ β
Notes:
Parameter Values are:
r=5 , w=2 ,       =1,        =0.6,      =0. 1,       =0.5. H q L q γ βTable 1: Aging, Labor and Income Taxes
Notes:
￿L - the labor tax
￿ - the income tax
An upward arrow indicates an increase in the tax rate as population ages
An downward arrow indicates a decline in the tax rate as population ages
165 Conclusion
We study two politico-economic forces that determine the size of the welfare state, when its
population ages: changes in the voting pivots and ￿scal leakages from tax payers to transfer
recipients. Tax revenues are generally biased in favor of the old (old-age social security,
medicare, etc.). Therefore, one would expect the pro-tax coalition to gain more political
clout as population ages; consequently, aging should tilt the political power balance in
favor of expanding the welfare state. However, a careful scrutiny of the politico-economic
equilibrium reveals more factors at play. First, the equilibrium is governed by the prefer-
ences of two voting pivots, one young and one old. Aging may change the young pivot to
a richer, more anti-tax individual. Second, the ￿scal leakage of revenues from the larger
number of old taxpayers of the capital tax component of the income tax to the young may
encourage the latter to vote for more taxes. But, on the other hand, the ￿scal leakage
from the young taxpayers of the labor tax component of the income tax to a larger number
of old bene￿ciaries may tame the appetite of the young for more taxes. As a result, the
welfare state does not necessarily expands, when its population ages.
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